The closing months of the year 2000 witnessed a short but intense countrywide upsurge of struggle by coal workers on the issue of the 6^th National Coal Wage Agreement (NCWA-6). The widespread protest actions and three-day strike in November were unprecedented in terms of breadth and extent of mass participation seen in the industry, particularly in Coal India, since the last 2 decades at least. The largely spontaneous outburst was directed as much against the JBCCI unions as against the Central Govt. It compelled revision of an already finalized agreement, securing some more economic benefits for workers, despite all the proclamations of sickness in the industry and has opened up the possibilities of struggles on wage agreement in other PSUs particularly the so-called loss-making ones.

Background

In Coal Industry wherein around 8 lakh workers are employed, wages and other service conditions are governed by National Coal Wage Agreements periodically arrived at through the Joint Bipartite Committee for Coal Industry (JBCCI) since 1973 after nationalization. The JBCCI is constituted by the Central Govt. with representatives of employers from Coal India Ltd. and its subsidiaries, Singareni Colliery Company Ltd. (AP), Indian Iron & Steel Co. (IISCO) and Tata Iron and Steel Co. (TISCO), all public sector units except TISCO. As workers’ representatives the Govt. has nominated five Central Trade Unions, viz. INTUC, AITUC, CITU, HMS, BMS. Coal India (including BCCL, ECL, CCL, NCL, SECL, MCL, WCL, NECL, CMPDI) with nearly 6 lakh workers is the largest constituent and therefore de facto chief negotiator and through it the Central Govt.

The NCWA-6 has been due from 1^st July 1996, but was greatly delayed as has been the case in most Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs). Only an interim relief of 12% was sanctioned in between. Workers were completely in the dark about the JBCCI deliberations as nothing was being revealed by the 5 unions publicly despite scores of JBCCI meetings, nor were they calling for any agitation. Sensing the restiveness among workers these 5 unions jointly called for a seven day strike from 12^th to 18^th May 2000 for early finalization of wage agreement and against privatization in coal industry. The call was given in a most non-serious manner, no preparations were made and as expected the call was also withdrawn on vague assurances.

MoU and After

Ultimately, after repeatedly publicly assuring of an early settlement, on 13^th September 2000 a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed, covering all the basic modalities of the wage agreement. It provided, in essence, for merger of Dearness Allowance (D.A.) and interim relief into basic pay and a measly flat increase of Rs. 6.99 per day (Rs. 181.95 per month) to all workers w.e.f. 1^st July 1996, the due date. Allowances were marginally increased but were to be paid only from 1^st July 1999. It was an agreement of total surrender before the Govt. The basic wage structure and principles of wage revision in the MoU had been agreed to by all 5 unions but at the last minute CITU did not sign, its only dispute being for some minor increase in the rate of allowances and payment of allowances from 1^st October 1998 instead of 1^st July 1999. Tacitly agreeing but not signing the agreement was a ritual which CITU had adopted during NCWA-5 also, its opposition being restricted to some press propaganda and some token protests. Same was the case this time too (particularly with an eye on the coming assembly elections in Bengal). The signatory trade unions were on the other hand justifying and attempting to take credit for getting a wage increase despite sickness of industry and threat of BIFR (particularly covering BCCL, ECL and CCL). Workers were obviously disappointed and dissatisfied but at the same time also tired by the long passive wait of 4 years. Tiring out workers by inordinate delay in settlement for years without any struggle has become an established practice of these central trade unions in the public sector.

Opposition Snowballs

Meanwhile however, the wage settlement of officers, giving them hefty pay increases was finalized and became public. The comparison intensified the discontent among the workers. However, what finally precipitated matters was the circular issued on 14^th October by Coal India HQ for implementing payment of revised wages according to the terms of the MoU which highlighted a major anomaly in DA. The Central Govt. had declared a new DA formula for implementation from 1^st January 1997 for all PSUs, while the coal agreement was from 1^st July 1996. The “grey” area of 6 months period had been inadequately compensated in the MoU resulting in a loss of 6% of wages on account of DA for workers. This consequence of the sheer irresponsibility of JBCCI unions (even CITU had not opposed on that ground) sparked off an upsurge among the workers.

The effect of loss in D.A. was felt maximum at the higher end of pay-scales. The office-clerks, senior workmen, foremen, supervisors, etc. were out in the streets within 24 hours as their pay in many instances was even decreasing with the new wage settlement. A spontaneous wave of protests swept through the coal industry with this section of workers, who are both vocal and influential among other workers, playing a prominent role. Even the traditional strikebreaker sections of workers were now vociferously calling for strike. Coal India withdrew the circular and stopped implementation of the MoU pending a fresh meeting of JBCCI, marking the first victory of workers. The protests however continued to snowball with widespread condemnation of leadership of JBCCI unions and even spontaneous burning of their effigies.

CITU, seeing the mood of the workers, finally gave up its hesitation and grabbing the opportunity gave a call for 3-day strike from November 20 to 22, 2000. The demand for increase in wages and allowances in the same proportion as given to officers rapidly gained popularity and CITU made this demand the centrepiece of its fresh 18-point charter of demands. The strike was spontaneous and totally successful in ECL, BCCL and CCL and to a somewhat lesser extent in other coal companies.

The game of one-upmanship between CITU on the one hand and INTUC, AITUC, HMS and BMS on the other, further intensified. An understanding on revising the agreement was arrived at between the 4 unions and the management but it was held back to let the pro-CITU impact of strike die down. These unions submitted a 39-point charter of demands and gave a notice for 6-day strike from 18^th December. CITU gave a notice for indefinite strike from 19^th December without specifying a date. Neither of the two made any preparations for this round of strikes. As expected, on 14^th December there was a meeting of the 4 unions with a group of central ministers and the proposed 6-day strike was called off. Final settlement was signed on 23-12-2000 by the 4 unions first. After that CITU meekly signed the same settlement without alteration of even a comma or fullstop and completely capitulated.

Agreement

In the revised settlement the 6% DA cut was restored. Additional benefits given were on general increment and 2 service-linked increments, leave encashment facility- an overall gain of Rs. 300 to 600 per month after the agitation for all the workers in service. It was a significant victory for a largely spontaneous workers’ upsurge albeit only a partial one even in economic terms. The workers were able to defend their existing wages from reduction rather than gain any significant increase in the basic wage structure. This can be seen by comparing the minimum wage in 1991 (start of NCWA-5) and in January 2001 which shows basically a wage freeze over 10 years.

Furthermore in lieu of the economic gains, the 5 unions surreptitiously granted many concession to the Govt. which are likely to gave a long term impact, like committing increase in production of 5% per year in underground mines and 10% per year in open cast mines and to reduce “absenteeism” by at least 5% per year. The threat of ever increasing work-load and decreasing job security is obvious.

Role of Other Forces

The IFTU affiliated Indian Federation of Coal Workers (IFCW) does not have an all-India strength to launch a countrywide agitation alone but IFTU unions played an active role in the struggle. A campaign followed by a successful demonstration at Coal India Headquarters in Kolkata on 16^th April 2000 was held demanding early conclusion of NCWA-6, stopping of privatization and democratic reconstitution of JBCCI.

IFTU unions took the lead in opposing the MoU of 13^th September 2000. In Singareni a massive campaign was launched with big demonstrations at all divisional offices and at the company headquarters and this forced the management to stop implementation of the MoU. In BCCL, IFTU union took the initiative for forming a joint struggle front with some craft unions and smaller non-JBCCI unions. CITU also tried to forge a similar front and ultimately a joint front of 9 unions – “Koyla Mazdoor Mukti Manch” was formed. A demonstration was held on behalf of the Manch at CIL HQ in Kolkata on 7^th November 2000 in which the IFTU union played a leading role. CITU’s attempt to sabotage the Kolkata demonstration alienated it from other constituents of the front. However in the interests of the workers’ struggle the Manch actively supported the 3-day strike call of CITU and in BCCL it was a major factor in the success of the strike. In other coal companies also as a result of the strong resentment among the workers against the MoU and the JBCCI unions, various forms of joint action committees and fronts sprang up during the course of the struggle with various political forces including ruling class forces also covertly joining and trying to cash in.

Review and Prospects

Apart from Singareni which has different traditions and history and is also administratively separate, the rest of the coal industry has been dormant for decades without any major struggle. As a result of the unbroken dominance of collaborationist, corrupt, non-struggling JBCCI unions, workers had on the one hand become habituated to being passive spectators to wage negotiations and other policy issues. On the other hand there was also a widespread suspicion and lack of faith in the JBCCI unions among the workers, although organizationally they remained members and accepted the fate as they saw no alternative. General dissatisfaction about the wage agreement was there this time too but most likely it would have been accepted by the workers like earlier ones but for certain new circumstances. Firstly, the simultaneous declaration of officers’ wage increase and the inevitable comparison accentuated the dissatisfaction. Secondly, the DA loss affected most that sections of workers who are vocal and influential although otherwise often anti-movement. They played a significant role in mobilizing and agitating. The influence of this “white-collar” section can also be seen in the widespread demand, which arose everywhere, for rejecting all unions and all non-worker leaders. This section was in the forefront of various joint action committees that cropped up with the slogans of “no union, no flag, and no outside leader”. In ECL, SECL, NCL, WCL, CMPDIL “action committees” were constituted on these principles. BCCL was the exception, because of the IFTU’s firm opposition and explanation of the pitfalls. The political pitfalls of this “non-political” line have already become exposed in ECL where the joint action committee has proved to be a cover for Trinamool Congress politics and has now been registered as one more union.

Another important factor was that within the JBCCI unions, with CITU ultimately coming out in active opposition, a viable centre for opposition became visible to workers and their anger got channelized although the physical role of its organization and activists was limited.

As of now the situation in coal industry is that there is dissatisfaction among the workers with the wage agreement but not anger. CITU, which had become the leader of the struggle, has thoroughly exposed itself by signing the agreement and has lost much of the prestige it gained. In the absence of any all-India alternative recognized by workers there remains no practical possibility of further struggle on the wage agreement as a whole. Although partial struggles can and should be built on issues pending in the agreement itself.

The agitational heat has subsided but there is a change in the situation. The general atmosphere of helplessness and defeatism among coal workers in Coal India has changed and faith in the path of struggle renewed to some extent. The hold of the JBCCI unions on the workers has been shaken and the possibility of struggle against their wishes has been proved in practice. There is opportunity for emergence of a non-collaborationist struggling alternative forum. Revolutionary trade unions must seriously address themselves to this task. A united patient effort will be required for this with a clear, principled perspective, firmly combating opportunist, narrow economist, so-called non-political trends. Uncompromising opposition to privatization and import of coal; reconstitution of JBCCI with workers’ (union) representation determined through secret ballot and opposition to the anti-worker conditions of NCWA-6 can form the rallying point for such a joint struggle forum. The dangling sword of privatization and MNCization with concomitant attack on jobs, wages and rights makes this necessary as well as possible.