(An analysis of defeat of LTTE in civil war in Sri Lanka by S K Mohan is being given here. Besides human suffering in the war between LTTE and Sri Lankan Govt. and historical context of this war, the analysis deals with the strategic and tactical mistakes by the LTTE leadership. We invite opinions on author’s views on different aspects of the war and the milieu in which it was fought and also on the conclusions drawn by the author.)  

‘You have buried us on our land. Oh enemy, where will you bury our land’

-Kasi Anandan, Tamil Eelam Poet

A dead body with staring eyes lying near the Nanthikadal (sea of conches) in Mullaiteevu marks the end of a quarter century of war in Sri Lanka. The incidents leading to the death remind one of the scene from Ernest Hemingway’s novel ‘For Whom the Bell Tolls’ where El Sordo and his comrades die in their valiant fight till their last on top of a hill.

As the guns have fallen silent, one can hazard any number of reviews and analyses. One is at liberty to praise or ridicule those who are no more. Poignant questions can be raised on the responsibility for the great defeat that has pushed the Sri Lankan Tamils thirty years back in to the history. Yehudi Menuhin brilliantly captures the mood about the twentieth century as ‘that it raised the greatest hopes ever conceived by humanity, and destroyed all illusions and ideals’[1]. Is it true for the twenty first century too? History starts with a great beginning that ends as a tragedy. Yet it is something that does not end with vain proclamations.

History tells us that Emperor Asoka turned to Buddhism after watching the great devastation in the Kalinga war where a hundred thousand perished and another hundred and fifty thousand were taken prisoners. That was more than two thousand years ago. Now the whole world witnessed the Buddhist President of Sri Lanka kissing the blood soaked land strewn with destruction. Hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDP) are held captive in the squalor called refugee camps. Many of refugees in the camps wouldn’t know which of their family members are alive. On the other side the chauvinist triumphalism ruled the streets in its boisterous celebration of the victory. History is a narrative that thrives in the clutches of the victor. It is also the incessant wailing of the vanquished.

The Sri Lankan President states that over a hundred thousand people have died in the twenty five year old civil war. Between April 27^th and May 19^th, during those last days of the war, it is estimated that twenty thousand have been killed averaging a thousand every day. Three hundred and fifty thousand are now in the refugee camps resembling an open prison. Thirty thousand amongst these are wounded and need medical care. The government declares that they would not send these people to their homes until they get hold of every single ‘terrorist’ within the camps. Women, children and the elderly – everyone is a ‘suspect’ in the eyes of the government. Theverajah Kajenthini, lost her parents and sister and is currently sheltered in Sivananda Thapovanam orphanage. Listen to her - ‘Like the other children in here we don't talk about the past. I am old enough to know my parents are gone but the younger children laugh and play and tell us their mums and dads are coming back ---- I saw my mother's body. She was on fire after the shelling and died of burns to her face and neck. Her head was black, it was the last I saw of her" [2]. Look at the devastation! Chinese weapons aid in one year was $ 10 billion. Military aid from Pakistan, amounted for $ 100 million. The aid from India is yet to be calculated. With armed forces of over 200,000 in a country of less than 20 million, Lanka is among the most militarized countries in the world. In the Tear Drop island the impoverished soldiers returned home in flower bedecked coffins with death on a full moon day[3]. What price is the victory? Cemeteries flood the dreamland of Eelam. What is the cost of the defeat? History is a ruthless soul. It is an edifice standing tall on the devastation and dead bodies. It gets rebuilt through the course of people’s struggles too.

Behind the current carnage lie six decades of futile pacts, empty peace talks and broken promises.  1956 – The Official Language Act, No. 33 declaration of Sinhala as the sole official language and massacre of Tamils in the east. 1958 – the Bandaranaike, Chelvanayagam pact (BC pact), pact followed by agitation by the opposition and pogroms on Tamils leading to unilateral abrogation, 1965 – The Senanaike, Chelvanayagam pact that was never meant to be implemented,  Sinhala state sponsored drive to colonize Tamil majority northern and eastern provinces by planting of Sinhala settlements, 1972- Constitutional amendment making Buddhism the de facto state religion, 1974-75 – severe discrimination in university admissions against Tamil students, 1977 – massacre of Tamils by Sinhala chauvinists, 1981- burning of the Tamil library in Jaffna and burning alive of Tamils,[4] 1983-2009 – four Eelam wars  interspersed with vain peace talks and agreements each leading to the next war. Wrecked agreements? Failed peace talks? Broken promises? History bears testimony to all. History is a promise for the future. Yet, it doesn’t comply with any of those accords and promises.

One has to note that this is the defeat of an estranged struggle. China, Pakistan and India – all the governments within the region were rooting for the defeat of LTTE.  It has been banished by 32 states with a ‘terrorist’ branding. Could one expect a genuine help from western powers which were all engaged in the genocides across the globe - Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan with their usage of weapons of mass destruction? Could one expect any assistance from mere condemnations & support statements devoid of any material action? What kind of support can one expect from a charade called ‘fasting’ before TV cameras? It is pertinent to note that the struggle was alienated. But when the array of global and regional powers is aligned against one struggle and with all of those mighty powers rooting for its defeat, can one expect it to last long? Can one expect it to succeed? History is a blind alley that shuts down all escape routes for besieged to create martyrs. Strangely, those capable of breaking free are never beleaguered.

II

The events in Sri Lanka provide important lessons to peoples movements. While the rulers, their armies and states learn their lessons from the victorious Sri Lankan state, peoples movements should learn their lessons from the defeat of LTTE. One has to view the strategic and tactical errors that have lead to this defeat.

Changed Global Scenario

1.      The cold war between USA and the Soviet camp provided a created a specific setting for movements in the world. In its earliest days, the progress of the Sri Lankan Tamil struggle was influenced by the tussle between the two powers in the Indian sub-continent. While the Sri Lankan government was in the US camp, the Indian government leant towards the USSR. During this period, the Indian government provided support and training to the struggle. The collapse of the Soviet camp tilted the balance in favour of the Sri Lanka government. Even as some of the LTTE’s spectacular military successes were still achieved during late 90s, it’s external support from international states was on the wane.

2.      Added to the above, the new situation made life difficult for armed movements that did not fit into American geo-political strategy. And after September 2001, the brand of “terrorism” has made direct international support very difficult. The lack of international support and inter-government collaboration in suppressing struggles can also be seen directly in the Sri Lanka and Nepal developments.

3.      The current decade also witnessed an active role of China in the Indian Ocean rim as it is involved in building of ports across Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka. China signed a US$1 billion deal in 2007 to construct a major port city in southern Sri Lankan town of Hambantota. Given the fact that about 70 percent of the China’s oil imports traverse through the main east west trade route just six nautical miles from Hambantota, it is viewed as the Chinese strategy to ‘"take control over the world energy jugular."  China emerged as a major donor to Sri Lanka as its aid increased fivefold during 2008.

“In April 2007 Sri Lanka signed a classified $37.6 million (£25 million) deal to buy Chinese ammunition and ordnance for its army and navy, according to Jane’s Defence Weekly.

China gave Sri Lanka — apparently free of charge — six F7 jet fighters last year, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, after a daring raid by the Tigers’ air wing destroyed ten military aircraft in 2007. One of the Chinese fighters shot down one of the Tigers’ aircraft a year later.”[5]

The LTTE failed to adapt its strategy and tactics according to the changed conditions.

Strategic Miscalculations

4.      Organizations conducting a protracted armed struggle need to identify strategic enemies and allies, and tactical allies that can give limited support for limited period. While the Government of India (GOI) could help, the LTTE depended excessively upon it in the initial phases. This provided an opportunity for GOI to interfere in the internal politics of Lanka and the Eelam struggle. Latter, by fighting a war with the Indian Peace-Keeping Force and killing Rajiv Gandhi, the LTTE pushed GOI into the enemy camp. With this act, it lost the opportunity of at least ensuring the neutrality of GOI.

5.      At the same time, the LTTE considered GOI and opportunistic political parties to be it’s strategic allies. It expected great support from them in its hour of need.

The above strategic political miscalculations on the part LTTE ultimately proved to be fatal.

6.      On the military front, LTTE failed to correctly estimate the strength and morale of enemy forces. In the earlier wars, the Lanka army could not match the LTTE and suffered considerable losses.

“LTTE succeeded in thwarting almost all major military campaigns launched by Sri Lankan army – Operation Edibala (February 1997), Operation Jayasikuru (may 1997-December 1998), Operation Rivi Bala (December 1998), operation Rana Gosa (1999), and the first six offensives under Operation Kinihira (1998-200) – inflicting enormous losses, destroying many small encampments and outposts, and capturing the major army bases of the north at Mullaiteevu (July 1996) and Elephant Pass (April 2000)….”[6]

“..however, the foregoing ‘achievements’ had several negative features among which the excessively heavy loss of lives among the LTTE cadres was more important than any other, at least from the short term perspectives. The military confrontations referred to earlier resulted in a decline in the number of Tiger warriors from an estimated 15,000 in 1997 to 7,000 by early 2001, a reduction in excess of 50 percent… One of the consequences was the LTTE resorting to conscription of children..”

“Equally prominent on the debit side of the Tiger ledger was the fact that the pre-cease fire battle field victories, though impressive as guerilla strikes, had not resulted in significant territorial gains except in a small area north of the township of Killinochi and the strategic ‘gateway’ of Elephant Pass. In the densely populated western segment of Jaffna peninsula, the heart of the ‘Tamil Homeland’, despite the do-and-die attempts of the year 200, there were no tangible gains. Indeed, through operations Agni Kheela and Kinihira VII (both conducted at the end of 2000), the Sri Lankan army regained some of the territory lost to the LTTE in earlier confrontations in localities adjacent to the Palay air base and along the southern corridor of access to Jaffna.”[7]

However, by the fourth Eelam war, the government vastly multiplied its forces. The infantry not only expanded its numbers but also learnt from earlier losses. “Learning from the past, they built up force levels on land, in the air and at sea to ensure success against the Tamil Tigers. The Sri Lanka Army went on a recruiting spree. For instance, in the year 2008 alone 40,000 troops were added, to raise 47 infantry battalions, 13 brigades, four task force contingents and two divisions. The Army now has 13 divisions, three task forces and one armoured brigade.”[8] It adapted a strategy of inflicting massive losses on the LTTE while minimizing its own.

The new strength of the air force is evident in the serial air raids. Analysts estimate that it conducted between 15,000 and 20,000 attacks.[9]

The navy was developed from coastal “brown water”, to a “blue water” force. This seriously affected the LTTE’s supply lines. Sea lanes from Colombo and Trincomalee to Jaffna came under government control.

“[The LTTE] totally lost their supplies and that turned the war,” says Vice-Adm Karannagoda. “It was one of the major turning points of the war that has been going on for the last 30 years.”

“With the Small Boats Concept finding success in sea battles against the Sea Tigers, use of Dvora FAC squadrons to gain control over the sea lines of communication, and deployment of OPVs to attack warehouse ships, the LTTE was unable to maintain dominance at sea. The number of recorded SLN contacts with the Sea Tigers in the post-ceasefire period from 2006–08 declined dramatically. In 2006, the SLN had 21 encounters with the Sea Tigers, with up to 30 craft on each side engaged in battles lasting up to 14 hours. A year later, the number of encounters had fallen to 11; in 2008 just four encounters with the Sea Tigers were registered by the SLN.”[10]

The LTTE underestimated the growth in the enemy force and its combat capability.

7.      Though LTTE had its own air force, it served more a propaganda purpose than to hit the enemy. There have been reports that during the peace talks, many LTTE guerillas had settled into family life and had children this reportedly affected their ability to fight.[11] Above all, with the revolt of Col. Karuna in the east, the LTTE had to withdraw from there. Thus, the east came completely under government control. Without taking these into consideration, the LTTE opted for a positional rather than mobile war.

Thus, while underestimating the military strength of the Sri Lankan state, LTTE also overestimated the capability of its own forces. These are the strategic miscalculations of LTTE on the military front.

Tactical Mistakes

8.      Boycott of the 2005 elections helped the victory of the hard-line Rajapaksa government.  “Rajapaksa owed his victory over his UNP rival, the former prime minister Ranil Wickremasinghe, to support from JVP and a similarly hard-line party formed by some Buddhist monks…Even then he prevailed by only razor-thin margin in a closely fought election – he polled 4,887,152 votes against 4,706,366 for Wickremasinghe. The dovish Wickremasinghe would have won had the LTTE not called on the Tamil voters to abstain. ..A Wickremasinghe win would have recharged the island’s peace constituency and opened up another opportunity – after the joint post-tsunami mechanism was scuttled by Sinhalese-Buddhist extremists-to revive the peace process.” [12]  The LTTE planned to resume armed struggle citing the attitude of the Rajapaksa government. However, it isolated the more liberal forces and helped the emergence of a hard-line, militarist government. Its tactics unified the enemy rather than divide it.

9.      The LTTE agreed to a ceasefire in 2001. However, the LTTE’s attitude seemed one of trying to come out of the pact and talks as early as possible. Going by the reports of the ceasefire monitors, the greatest number of violations was from the LTTE.

With these, the LTTE gave room for charges that it was not prepared for peaceful negotiations. These are the tactical political mistakes on the part of LTTE.

10.  As mentioned above, LTTE chose for a positional defensive warfare rather than mobile warfare. LTTE stuck to its positional war fare tactics despite the heavy losses, forced retreats and rapidly shrinking areas of influence. It surprising to note that none of these factors made LTTE rethink on its plans.

11.  With the series of setbacks in the war, the LTTE moved ordinary civilians along with its forces. With this, it is natural to face accusations of using unarmed civilians as human shields. However, it has to be observed that it is not possible to constantly move over 2000,000 civilians with an army of just 20,000. It can be assumed that the civilians went with the LTTE because they did not have faith in the Sri Lankan government and its army. However, the LTTE had its own interests in encouraging this. Their idea was that loss of civilian life would put pressure on the government. The LTTE has no satisfactory reply to the government’s charge of using the people as human shields. Regardless of this, civilians have been massacred and the government is mainly responsible for this.

The tragedy is unparalleled in the annals of military history. During World War II, the Soviet counter strategy to the ‘the greatest military march in world history” (as claimed by Hitler) was ‘a war of the whole people." The Red Army fought for “every inch of Soviet soil,” and "in case of forced retreat,” everything valuable was to be “evacuated or destroyed”.  “How this Soviet strategy exhausted Germany, is told by Howard K. Smith in his book, Last Train from Berlin. The German war machine and the German people had fattened on the loot of Europe; they starved when Hitler entered Russia. Their troops came to the Dnieper and happily saw beyond the ruined dam the massive buildings of the great Dnieper industries, the first factories they had seen intact in the USSR, says Smith. But when they reached the buildings, every machine down to the last bolt and nut, had gone East. ‘That was defense,’ says Smith.” [13]

Referring to Sri Lankan situation, Muralidhar Reddy noted that, “The Army marched through 68 small and medium towns and villages under the administrative control of the LTTE in the north. These included Kilinochchi, the so-called administrative and political headquarters of the Tigers, and Mullaithivu, the LTTE’s military hub and the main base of the Sea Tigers. But the astonishing thing is that only 5,000-odd civilians crossed over to government-controlled territory or reported at the makeshift camps set up for internally displaced people by the government.”

“The million-dollar question is, where did the civilians disappear as town after town and village after village in the five districts of the north came under military control?”

“….. Correspondents based in Colombo, who were taken on occasional conducted tours by the Defence Ministry to areas captured by the military in the north, were struck by the sight of ghost towns and villages over hundreds of miles.”[14]

As the war progressed, there is evidence that LTTE dealt ruthlessly with civilians. However, from a logistical point of view, it would definitely not have been possible for LTTE to forcibly move the civilians along with them in the initial days.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army defeated encirclement through its “long march.” A vast geographical area favoured the Chinese guerillas. In the limited area of Sri Lanka, the LTTE did not reconsider its military tactics. Moving thousands of civilians with them made mobile war impossible. Some times “a resistance too long prolonged in a besieged camp is demoralising in itself. It implies suffering, fatigue, loss of rest, illness and the continual presence not of the acute danger which tempers but of the chronic danger which destroys”[15]. The LTTE ignored this aspect in its military tactics and stuck to its positional warfare.

Thus, LTTE’s tactical mistakes on the military front are – sticking to positional warfare rather despite the setbacks and carting off along with the civilians that precluded the option of mobile warfare.

Lessons

1.      The problem of supreme leaders and monolithic structures has to be recognized here. It should be noted that the nature of the goal and its class basis (of both the goal and the organization) contribute to the preeminence of individuals within the organization as ‘supreme leaders’. While we cannot ignore the role of leadership, one cannot ascribe infallibility to them. Monolithic organisations which do not permit dissent and debate stunt the philosophical basis of movements. Predominance of such structures leads to tremendous violence in society. This is a lesson that has to be drawn from LTTE history. One person’s vision with sole ambition of establishing Eelam, his shortsightedness in ignoring changed circumstances, his stubbornness and inflexibility, and opportunism in joining hands with anybody, his transition from being a leader to ‘Sun God’ (Sooriya Thevan) status – the impact of all these on the rise and fall of the LTTE – these are the issues that need to be thoroughly examined. The attitude that LTTE should be the sole representative of the Tamil people led to internal massacres. The absence of debate over tactics led to a situation where its mistakes could not be corrected.

2.      Organisations conducting protracted war have to take into consideration the ebb and flow of the war, weakness and decline of values in individuals, and their own organisations. Enemies with vast resources, invariably exploit these weaknesses. Acquiring weapons and huge inflow of funds from the international Tamil community created complications in the LTTE. Jane’s Intelligence Review estimates, the income of the LTTE in 2007 as between $ 200 and 300 million.[16] There have been accusations of involvement in drugs, fake credit cards, weapons trade and smuggling. The growing importance of these activities in the LTTE led to serious internal contradictions and created a situation where a second line of leadership could not emerge when the main leadership was liquidated.

3.      The ups and downs of prolonged war intensify contradictions within organisations. The social and regional base of individuals adds to these and creates opportunities for the enemy. The result of under-estimating these contradictions can be seen in the Karuna affair. Karuna exploited the dominance of northerners (‘Jaffna Tamils’) in the leadership of the LTTE (over the eastern ‘Batticaloa Tamils’) for his ends. The lack of freedom to air dissent complicated resolving these contradictions.

4.      Organisations conducting armed struggle must recognise another important fact - that their guiding principle must be minimising bloodshed and loss of life. Though the enemy ignores all principles and values, the movement must uphold them. Organisations fighting for lofty values and ideals must conduct their struggle according to those values and ideals. If those leading the movement do not uphold vales that the enemy violates, what values are they fighting for?

Hobsbawm succinctly observes that, “there is a more dangerous producer of unlimited violence. It is the ideological conviction that has dominated both international and internal conflicts since 1914, that one’s cause so just and the adversary’s so terrible that all means to achieve victory or avoid defeat are not only legitimate but necessary. This means that both states and insurrectionaries feel they have a moral justification for barbarism. “[17]

This is no metaphysical debate over violence and non-violence, but a basic question of values and ideals. In this connection, one has to question the tactics of “suicide” attacks and political assassination that the LTTE practiced widely. The Liberation Tigers “are best known as one of the great pioneers and probably largest operators of suicide bombing….Originally a spin-off from the Iranian Revolution of 1979, carrying its powerful ideology of Shia Islam, and with its idealisation of martyrdom, it was first used to decisive effect in 1983 against the American by the Hezbollah in Lebanon”.[18] The LTTE took the suicide bombing to its zenith. It has ignored all criticism of its means and methods.

5.      After the Vietnam War, few guerilla movements have succeeded. There have been struggles in various countries world over but most of them have not been able to break the strategic stalemate and reach the strategic offensive phase. Even those reaching the strategic offensive phase could not sustain for long. One has to thoroughly analyse the underlying political and military causes behind this. The movements in Nepal and Sri Lanka have inspired many. There have been attempts to mimic these struggles in India. Such attempts met with a failure as they failed take the specific socio, economic and political context in those countries.

6.      The success of the revolutionary struggles is not solely determined by the organisational capabilities. It is an undeniable fact that no other armed outfit could match the LTTE in its military and organisational strength. It could fight even the Indian army which is mightier than the Sri Lankan army during the Eelam wars.  Such being the history, why is it that the LTTE met with a tragic defeat now? The reasons for this defeat lie in the political and military strategy and tactics pursued by the LTTE. Organizational and military fortitude alone can not guarantee the success of a struggle.

III

According to ancient Sri Lankan history, after defeating Elara, Sinhala King Dutugemunu ordered that every horseman must dismount when he reached the tomb of Elara as a mark of respect to very man Dutugemunu had defeated in war. [19]  The current chauvinist triumphalism negates the worthy traditions of Sri Lankan history. The Sri Lankan authorities arrested an astrologer Chandrasiri Bandara for predicting that the government would flounder in September and October because of political and economic problems. Doesn’t this act reflect the insecurity of the victors? History is a pleasing note that the rulers love to listen to as it resonates amongst the cemeteries as they crush the rebellions. Yet it also points to a righteous anger that always haunts the rulers and fosters their insecurity.

History is replete with examples of mighty empires that have crumbled and redrawn borders that were once determined by the conquerors.  No dictator in the world has yet discovered a weapon that can permanently suppress an entire nation. The government and Sinhala chauvinists may think they have destroyed the dream of Eelam. But, so long as a fourth of its citizens are treated as slaves, such joy is short-lived.

References